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Abstract We estimate the benefits of electricity locational marginal pricing (LMP)
that arise from better coordination of day-ahead commitment decisions and real-time
balancing markets in adjacent power markets when there is significant uncertainty in
demand and wind forecasts. To do so, we formulate a series of stochastic models for
committing and then dispatching electric generators subject to transmission limits.
In the unit commitment stage, the models optimise day-ahead generation schedules
under either the full set of network constraints or a simplified net transfer capacity
(NTC) constraint, where the latter represents the present approach for limiting for-
ward electricity trade in Europe. A subsequent redispatch model then creates feasible
real-time schedules. Benefits of LMP arise from decreases in expected start-up and
variable generation costs resulting from consistent consideration of the full set of
network constraints both day-ahead and in real time. Meanwhile, coordinating adja-
cent balancing markets provides benefits because intermarket flows can be adjusted in
real-time in response to changing conditions. To quantify these benefits, we analyse
a stylised four-node network, examining the effects of varying system characteristics
on the magnitude of the locational-based unit commitment benefits and the benefits
of intermarket balancing. We conclude that both categories of benefits are situation
dependent, such that small parameter changes can lead to large changes in expected
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benefits. Although both can amount to a significant percentage of operating costs, we
find that the benefits of coordinating balancing markets generally exceed unit com-
mitment benefits.
Keywords Electricity prices · International electricity exchange · Electricity market
model · Electricity transmission · Unit commitment
JEL Classification L94
List of symbols
Sets
H Nodes, index h
I All generators, index i
I h Generators at node h, index i
J Real-time net load scenarios, index j
K Transmission lines, index k
T Time periods, index t
Parameters
CL Real-time penalty for deviating from day-ahead international
schedules ($/MWh)
FCi Fixed cost of generator i if committed ($/h)
Ht Length of time period t (h)
MCi Marginal cost of generator i($/MWh)
NTC Net transfer capacity in the NTC unit commitment model (MW)
Qmini Minimum run level of generator i , if committed (MW)
Qmaxi Maximum run level of generator i , if committed (MW)
PTDFhk Power transmission distribution factor, describing the effect upon flow
on line k as a result of a unit power injection at h consistent with the
linearised DC load flow model (MW/MW)
PR j Probability of scenario j
Dhjt Quantity demanded, net of wind output, at node h in scenario j , period
t (MW)
SUi Start-up costs of generator i ($/start)
Tk Flow constraint on transmission line k (MW)
Decision variables
sit Binary variable representing the decision to start-up generator i in time
period t
zi t Binary variable representing the decision to operate generator i in time
period t
qi j t Generation by generator i in real-time scenario j , time period t (MW), as
anticipated by the unit commitment model
qi j t Actual real-time dispatch of generator i in scenario j , time period t (MW)
l j t Shortfall of real-time international power flow from day-ahead schedule in
scenario j , time period t (MW)
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1 Introduction
European electricity markets have changed profoundly in the last decades. Increased
deregulation and privatisation have accompanied the decoupling of transmission, dis-
tribution and generation activities in national electricity markets. At the same time,
markets are becoming increasingly interconnected. Moreover, rapid growth of renew-
able generation is leading to more operational uncertainty, which will encourage even
more interconnection in the future. As a consequence of these developments, the need
for an efficient congestion pricing mechanism to facilitate international electricity
trade in Europe while respecting transmission and security constraints is becoming
increasingly important (Brunekreeft et al. 2005; Hobbs et al. 2005).
At present, interconnection capacity between most European countries is auctioned
day ahead or earlier, and not explicitly coordinated with the operation of energy mar-
kets. The amount of available transmission capacity, called Net Transfer Capacity
(NTC), is determined by transmission system operators (TSOs).1 For three reasons,
these NTCs are generally set lower than the sum of the thermal current limits of the
constituent individual transmission lines. First, spare capacity needs to be provided to
ensure system security. In particular, in case of generator or line outages, flows may
suddenly increase between the countries, which need to be accommodated safely. Sec-
ondly, interconnections often consist of several individual circuits, so that, depending
on the precise locations and amounts of load and generation, it is possible that indi-
vidual circuits may be overloaded even though the total flow is less than the sum of
the thermal capacities of the constituent circuits. Third, in the absence of a locational
pricing system, the locations and levels of generation and load are not precisely known
at the time of the day-ahead auction, so the exact pattern of flows between countries
will also be uncertain. Thus, the TSO will generally set NTCs to a conservatively
low level to ensure feasibility of those flows. However, even with those precautions,
some scheduled flows might still be infeasible in real time so that redispatch will be
necessary. On the other hand, if spare capacity is available in real time, there may
be opportunities for incremental trade between balancing markets. However, the eco-
nomic value of that trade may be less than if the opportunity had been anticipated
the day before when committing generators, because once committed, the generation
system’s flexibility is limited in real time.
Another inefficiency in market designs that locational-based pricing can address
is the lack of coordination of balancing mechanisms in different markets. Presently,
TSOs in adjacent European countries manage transmission constraint violations and
unscheduled imbalances by redispatch within their own market areas, while attempt-
ing to maintain day-ahead schedules of international power exchange (Oggioni and
Smeers 2009). If neighbouring operators could coordinate their balancing markets
1 In reality, there is a difference between NTCs, which in Europe are published twice a year as market
guidance, and Available Transmission Capacities (ATCs), which are usually calculated day-ahead for a
whole day and represent the actual amount of trade that will be allowed. ATCs for any given day can differ
significantly from the earlier announced NTCs. In our analysis, we do not make a distinction between the
two, but simply refer to the amount of transmission capacity that can be auctioned as NTC.
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while respecting locational constraints, redispatch costs could be reduced and addi-
tional trading opportunities exploited.
Clearly, the use of NTCs rather than the actual network constraints to limit day-
ahead trade cannot, at least in theory, maximize expected net welfare. This is also true
of the failure to coordinate real-time redispatch in adjacent markets. An alternative,
which is implemented in several markets around the world and is currently being con-
sidered by regulators in the European Union, is the use of locational marginal pricing
(LMP) in both day-ahead and real-time markets. LMP is also known as nodal pricing,
flow-based allocation or market splitting. As described by Schweppe et al. (1988), a
nodal pricing system defines a marginal price at each location and time period that
reflects the cost of delivering power to that location at that time, given the transmission
constraints. Hsu (1997) gives a detailed explanation of this process. These prices are
obtained by clearing energy and transmission markets simultaneously in a single opti-
misation model, recognising the impact of all network constraints. LMP is now used in
by TSOs in six regional markets in the U.S.; O’Neill et al. (2008) provide an overview
of US LMP systems, and Price (2007) describes one implementation in detail. If LMP
could be implemented Europe-wide, international transmission would not have to be
auctioned off. Instead, transmission capacity could be allocated by pricing constraints
efficiently in multi-country day-ahead and real-time energy markets.
In the next section, we review the various sources of purported benefits of imple-
menting LMP, including the two categories analyzed in this paper: those arising from
improved unit commitment decisions and coordination of real-time markets. Then in
Sect. 3, we present our methodology. Data assumptions are summarised in Sect. 4,
followed by the results in Sect. 5 and conclusions in Sect. 6.
2 Benefits of LMP
Introducing a Europe-wide LMP system could enhance power market efficiency in
several ways. First of all, it could lead to short-term efficiency improvements. These
include the following:
1. More efficient unit commitment, as all transmission constraints within and
between countries are taken into account when commitment decisions are made,
rather than a subset or aggregate representation.
2. Improved dispatch within countries, as transmission losses are considered in clear-
ing the market. This can be important during periods of high transmission flows.
3. Allocative efficiency improvements, since the LMPs give power consumers in
export-constrained areas incentives to increase their consumption, and those
in import-constrained areas to reduce theirs, which alleviates congestion and
increases social welfare. This can motivate investments in demand response pro-
grams that target areas where such response would be most valuable to the system
(Chao 2010).
4. Gains from more efficient real-time international trade, as NTCs are not needed
to limit day-ahead trade.
5. Reductions in market power by facilitating entry by external producers into mar-
kets in the form of additional trade in forward markets (because conservative
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NTCs will not constrain trade, so transmission capacity is used more efficiently)
and in real time (because of the linking of real-time markets in adjacent coun-
tries).2
6. Reductions in generator gaming opportunities arising from inconsistent treatment
of transmission constraints in multi-settlement markets. An infamous example is
the inc-dec game, in which generators in export-constrained locations place low
bids in the day-ahead market, knowing that, although they will be scheduled day-
ahead, the congestion they create will have to be alleviated in real time, allowing
them to buy their power back at a lower price. Thus, in the absence of LMP, some
generators can make money without generating power.3 In an LMP-based mar-
ket, transmission constraints will be taken into account in the day-ahead market,
taking away the incentives for this game.
7. Increased security of network operation through increased visibility.
The first two in the above list are the focus of our analysis. Second, there are potential
long-term efficiency improvements. These can arise from better siting of power plants
and industrial loads, as congestion costs are included in private cost-benefit analy-
ses, and possibly from the substitution of better management of existing transmission
assets for transmission investment. Brunekreeft et al. (2005) discuss both short- and
long-term efficiency improvements in more detail.
Our work explores the determinants of two specific components of the benefits
of considering network constraints via LMP that have not been examined separately
before: those arising from more efficient unit commitment and from international bal-
ancing. Our purpose is to quantify these two categories of benefits for a four-node
network, which is deliberately kept simple to explore the economic drivers that deter-
mine the magnitude of the estimates benefits.4
Many studies have recommended nodal pricing over other market designs (e.g.,
Chao et al. 2000; Ehrenmann and Smeers 2005; Brunekreeft et al. 2005; Imran and
Bialek 2008), and some have estimated individual categories of LMP benefits for par-
ticular markets. Most of those analyses focus on allocative efficiency and dispatch
improvements, with a few studies also reporting benefits resulting from more effi-
cient international transmission and more efficient unit commitment. Green (2007)
estimates that a change to LMP would provide efficiency benefits in the UK in the
amount of 1.5% of generator revenues due to better dispatch and allocative efficiency.
Leuthold et al. (2005) estimate a 0.6–1.3% increase in social surplus in Germany, with
2 The value of additional trade for mitigating market power has been considered in transmission planning
in California (Awad et al. 2010) and Italy (Vaiani et al. 2007) by simulating the resulting decreases in
price-cost margins.
3 As just one example, prior to 2005, a dec game was played by two generating companies located behind
the Miguel substation constraint in the former southern California zone. This game cost California con-
sumers approximately $3–$4 million per month, and increased margins to those generators by about $5 for
each MWh they generated (CAISO 2005). In general, intrazonal congestion costs far exceeded interzonal
congestion prior to implementation of LMP in California in 2008. For examples from other markets, see
Hogan (1999).
4 It is possible that the international redispatch benefits could be realised by balancing mechanisms other
than coupled LMP systems. To the extent that TSO efficient coordination by be achieved by other systems,
our estimates of this category of benefits are relevant to evaluation of those mechanisms.
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an additional 1% if more wind capacity is built, because that would increase conges-
tion. They do not describe the exact sources of those benefits, but these include more
efficient domestic dispatch and allocative efficiency. Weigt (2006) extends the model
used in Leuthold et al. (2005) to include unit commitment of aggregations of power
plants and international transmission; he obtains a benefit equal to 0.06% of the social
surplus for the whole of Europe, the net effect of a 0.78% increase in consumer surplus
and a 3.55% decrease in producer surplus. In the U.S., an empirical analysis of trade
changes accompanying expansion of the Pennsylvania–New Jersey–Maryland (PJM)
LMP system to the Midwestern U.S. found that gains from trade more than doubled
between the original and newly included regions of PJM (Mansur and White 2009).
The benefit was approximately $170M/year, compared to a one-time cost of $40M to
extend PJM.
The study that is closest to our analysis of unit commitment benefits is Barth et al.
(2009), who estimate an LMP benefit of 0.1% of total system operation cost for the
2015 EU power system with over 125 GW of wind capacity. These benefits result from
improved efficiency of international transmission, domestic dispatch, and commitment
of aggregations of generating units that result from considering all international load-
flow constraints day-ahead, rather than just NTCs. Their analysis does not consider
uncertainty in demand or wind forecasts, nor do they disaggregate these benefits by
category or report sensitivity analyses. As each country is treated as a zone, with no
consideration of individual circuits between countries or congestion within countries,
this estimate should be viewed as a lower bound.
There are fewer quantitative analyses of the benefits of international redispatch,
although there is a large amount of literature that argues for its adoption (e.g., Meeus
et al. 2005; Vandezande et al. 2008, 2010). Oggioni and Smeers (2009) use a simple
network similar to ours to study the benefits of coordinating international redispatch
arising from the coupling of electricity markets. They find that market coupling with
LMP is more efficient than using NTCs and that, in a system with NTCs, international
coordination is more efficient than domestic-only redispatch for adjusting schedules
in order to meet all transmission constraints (saving 0.4 e/MWh or more, for the
system analysed). Their benefit estimates are likely to be low because they include
neither benefits arising from better unit commitment (as commitment decisions are
not considered) nor benefits of coordinating balancing markets in the face of uncertain
loads and supplies (as their model assumes no uncertainty). Meanwhile, Vandezande
et al. (2009) estimate the benefits of cross-border balancing between Belgium and The
Netherlands (compared to no international redispatch) to be around 40% of the total
balancing costs.
3 Methodology
Although it is clear that both the benefits of more efficient unit commitment and those
of international balancing can potentially be significant, it is impossible to draw gen-
eral conclusions about their existence, magnitude and determinants based on economic
theory alone. Large-scale simulation models, which usually aim to be realistic repre-
sentations of real electricity grids, are useful to estimate the overall benefits of LMP
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but, because of their size, are less suitable to analyse separate categories or explore
the economic intuition behind them. We therefore simulate a simple network. This
allows us to not only estimate the benefits of better unit commitment and redispatch
separately, but also to run the simulation many times with different parameters and to
explore the economic reasons behind the observed patterns.
To do this, we use stochastic two-stage programming techniques to find the
unit commitment (first-stage) and redispatch (second stage) decisions that minimize
expected system costs over the distribution of possible real-time conditions. Doing this
considering the full set of transmission constraints in both stages (the LMP approach)
will, by the definition of optimisation, yield expected costs that are no worse than the
expected cost resulting from a heuristic approach considering only approximate NTC
constraints at the commitment stage and waiting until real-time to impose the actual
network constraints.
However, in practice, the consideration of network constraints in unit commitment
may not be better because of other approximations used by market operators, such
as deterministic security constraints or the use of a single demand or wind scenario
to make commitment decisions. To avoid spurious results due to arbitrary choice of
such constraints or scenarios, we use stochastic optimisation models, in which the
contingencies that motivate operating reserves are explicitly represented. With these
models, we can analyse the benefits of LMP in isolation, without the picture being
muddied by other market imperfections.
We consider the simple network in Fig. 1. There are two countries or markets, each
having two nodes, or ‘buses.’ These buses are connected by four lines, and the only
contingencies we consider in our base cases are load and wind variations in Country 2
(nodes C and D). As a sensitivity analysis, we consider variations at A and B as well.
However, our modelling approach is general and can be used for a system with more
buses and other types of random events.
We consider two basic models, where the first has two variants. The first basic
model is Model NTC, which is a sequence of two decision stages. The day-ahead unit
commitment problem is first solved subject to an NTC between the two countries,
followed by real-time redispatch, which is conducted subject to the actual network
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Fig. 2 Sequence of decisions and calculations in models
constraints and wind/demand realisations, as well as the previously determined com-
mitment schedule. The second basic model is Model LMP, in which the unit commit-
ment problem is instead solved subject to the full network constraints. Two different
instances of model NTC are examined. In the first, real-time redispatch (or ‘balanc-
ing’) is coordinated (NTC-ID), so that real-time schedules can differ under different
realisations of real-time load and wind. The other allows only domestic redispatch,
maintaining the same total MW of international flow as scheduled day-ahead (NTC-
NID). Figure 2 gives a schematic overview of the sequence of calculations for each
model.
In each case, unit commitment is day-ahead for 24 h. For simplicity, we group these
hours into three time periods representing peak, off-peak and shoulder hours. The only
commitment costs are start-up and minimum run (‘fixed’) costs, and the only commit-
ment constraints are minimum run constraints; ramp limits and minimum shut-down
or operating times are not considered. When making commitment decisions, net load
(load net of wind generation) is unknown. Instead, there are several net load scenarios,
each with a known probability. In all models in real time, the committed generators
are dispatched against the realised net load recognising the actual network constraints.
We assume that all generators truthfully bid their costs and commitment constraints,
and do not attempt to exercise market power.
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3.1 Model NTC
Unit commitment stage
Given the list of symbols, the objectives of both models NTC and LMP are the start-up
and fixed commitment costs plus the expectation (over real-time scenarios) of variable
costs:
min{sit ,zit ,qi j t}
∑
t∈T
⎡
⎣
∑
i∈I
(SUi sit + Ht FCi zit ) +
∑
j∈J
PR j Ht
∑
i∈I
MCi qi j t
⎤
⎦ (1)
This is optimised subject to the following constraints. The first set allows generation
only if a unit is committed (zit = 1), and force start-up costs to be incurred (sit = 1)
if a unit is committed in one period after being off:
Qmini zi t ≤ qi j t ≤ Qmaxi zi t ∀i, j, t (2)
zit − zi,t−1 ≤ sit ∀i, t (3)
sit ≥ 0 ∀i, t (4)
Combustion turbines help avoid infeasibilities in real time, since they typically can
be committed or decommitted within 10–30 min; these units are modelled as having
no maximum or minimum run levels, but they have to produce non-negative amounts
of power. We assume ample such capacity, and so do not include an upper bound.
Electricity sinks are also included to avoid infeasibilities in Country 1 in overgen-
eration situations; they can only consume power (which is modelled as production
of non-positive amounts of power), at a cost. Exact formulations of the constraints
applying to combustion turbines and electricity sinks can be found in Van der Weijde
and Hobbs (2010).
Load has to be met in every scenario:
∑
i∈I
qi j t =
∑
h∈H
Dhjt ∀ j, t (5)
Country 1 cannot produce more power than the NTC allows it to export:
∑
i∈I A
qi j t +
∑
i∈I B
qi j t ≤ NTC ∀ j, t (6)
As mentioned, we examine two instances of this model; one in which international
redispatch is possible (NTC-ID), and one where the total amount of electricity traded
from A to B in real-time in all scenarios is to adhere to the day-ahead schedule (NTC-
NID) subject to imbalance penalties. In the version of the model in which no interna-
tional redispatch is allowed in real-time (NTC-NID), we impose the same international
flow in every scenario j :
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∑
i∈I A
qi j t +
∑
i∈I B
qi j t =
∑
i∈I A
qi, j+1,t +
∑
i∈I B
qi, j+1,t ∀ j < |J | (7)
However, we omit this constraint for NTC-ID, and flows can depend on the real-time
scenario.
Dispatch stage
In real time, start-up and fixed costs are sunk, so only the variable costs and the costs
of not meeting the committed interregional transmission flow are minimised:
min{qi j t ,l j t }
∑
t
Ht
(
∑
i∈I
MCi qi j t + l j t CL
)
(8)
Constraint (9) is similar to those in the unit commitment stage:
Qmini z∗i t ≤ qi j t ≤ Qmaxi z∗i t ∀i, j, t (9)
where z∗i t is the optimal value of zit from the unit commitment model. The energy
balance is:
∑
i∈I
qi j t =
∑
h∈H
Dhjt ∀ j, t (10)
Instead of constraint (6), flows are now constrained by the full set of network con-
straints:
∑
h∈H
PTDFhk
⎛
⎝
∑
i∈I h
qi j t − Dhjt
⎞
⎠ ≤ Tk ∀k, j, t (11)
As mentioned above, in the version of the model without international redispatch in
real-time (NTC-NID), the redispatch in each j must result in the same total MW flow
between the two countries as the day-ahead commitment model calculates unless a
schedule deviation penalty l j t CL is paid. The possibility of schedule deviations must
be considered because completely fixing the total trade in A and B could lead to infea-
sibilities. The following constraints define a nonnegative shortfall l j t as the difference
between the scheduled and real-time flow from Country 1 to Country 2, Only shortfalls
in real-time flows need to be considered, since excess flows can be avoided by taking
advantage of electricity sinks in nodes A and B.
∑
i∈I A
qi j t +
∑
i∈I B
qi j t + l j t =
∑
i∈I A
q∗i j t +
∑
i∈I B
q∗i j t ∀k, j, t (12)
l j t ≥ 0 ∀ j, t (13)
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where q∗i j t is the generation anticipated in the commitment stage, and is treated as a
fixed parameter in the real-time model.
3.2 Model LMP
Unit commitment stage
The only difference between the NTC and LMP models is that the LMP unit commit-
ment and real-time stages use the same (full) set of transmission constraints. Hence,
Model LMP minimises (1) subject to constraints (2)–(5) and
∑
h∈H
PTDFhk
⎛
⎝
∑
i∈I h
qi j t − Dhjt
⎞
⎠ ≤ Tk ∀k, j, t (14)
Dispatch stage
Model LMP’s real-time objectives and constraints are the same as those for Model
NTC-ID. Note that for the LMP model, q∗i j t is also an optimal solution in real time,
and so it is not necessary to solve the dispatch model separately. Equation 1 subject
to (2)–(5) and (14) solves the entire problem.
3.3 Calculating the benefit of LMP and international redispatch
Letting q∗i j t be the optimal dispatch value from the dispatch model, we can then calcu-
late the total actual expected cost for each model as the sum of the start-up and fixed
commitment costs from the unit commitment stage plus the expected (across real-time
scenarios) variable costs from the redispatch stage:
E[TC] =
∑
t∈T
⎡
⎣
∑
i∈I
SUi s∗i t + Ht FCi z∗i t +
∑
j∈J
PR j Ht
∑
i∈I
(MCi q∗i j t + l j t CL)
⎤
⎦
(15)
This is done both for the NTC and LMP models. Subtracting the LMP model cost from
the NTC-NID model cost yields an estimate of the total estimated benefits of LMP,
including both the unit commitment and international redispatch (balancing market
coordination) benefits of considering network constraints day-ahead and in real-time.
Meanwhile, comparing just the NTC-ID and LMP costs gives an estimate of only the
unit commitment benefits, while the difference between the NTC-NID and NTC-ID
costs represents the incremental benefits of international redispatch.
The degree of distortion of costs because of the use of the NTC constraint in the
unit commitment stage of Model NTC, rather than actual flow constraints (as in the
LMP model), will depend on the MW of NTC that is imposed day-ahead. In order to
avoid overstating the benefits of LMP because of a poor choice of NTC, we report a
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set of results in which we tune the value of NTC in each run of Model NTC in order
to minimize expected unit commitment and actual dispatch costs from that model
(Eq. 15), and then compare those costs to the objective function of Model LMP, as
just described. This simulates a NTC definition process in which the neighbouring
TSOs cooperate to determine a single limit on flows to be applied in all time periods
of the day that will give the most economic benefit, guarding against infeasibilities
that might arise under extreme demand and wind scenarios. In addition, we will also
compute those benefits for fixed values of NTC (85% of thermal line capacities) to
show how much larger the estimated benefits of LMP would be if operators do not
tune NTC in that manner. The latter situation is arguably more realistic, since NTCs
are usually chosen day-ahead for a whole day.
4 Data assumptions
Assumed generator start-up costs, marginal operating costs and fixed costs are shown
in Table 1. These values were based upon Bard (1988), with the following changes.
Units were renumbered for convenience. Start-up costs were calculated as the average
between a hot start-up and a cold start-up. The assumed variable cost per MWh was
calculated in three steps. First, we calculated Bard (1988) assumed marginal operating
cost at the midpoint of each unit’s operating range. Then, we increased the variation
in marginal costs among generators in the sample to make them more representative
of cost variations among plants in 2010 by expanding the range of marginal costs by
a factor of four by the following transformation:
MCi ← 4(MCi − MCmin) + MCi (16)
where MCmin is the smallest value of MCi among units i . The next change was to dou-
ble fixed, marginal and start-up costs to reflect two decades of inflation. This results
in a dataset with similar ratios of start-up and fixed costs to variable costs as the plants
in Shaw (1995); Kazarlis et al. (1996), and a recent sample of generators in The Neth-
erlands. The plants were then distributed among the nodes so that cheaper generation
tends to be in Country 1, so that it will tend to export power to Country 2. The final
modification to Bard (1988) dataset was to add combustion turbines at nodes C and
D to avoid having inadequate generation and imports to meet load, and power sinks
(called Xi in Table 1) at all nodes to avoid infeasibilities due to overgeneration.
For simplicity, we only consider variability in load net of wind generation in our
scenarios; contingencies due to transmission or generation equipment outages are not
included. With the exception of one sensitivity analysis, only Country 2 (nodes C and
D) has uncertain net load.5 We consider four scenarios, and three time periods. Period
3, the peak hour, has the highest net load levels; they are listed in Table 2. Net load
levels in period 2 are 2/3 of peak load, and those in period 1 are 1/3 of peak load.
5 We made several model runs where there is also uncertainty in exporting Country 1, which could occur,
e.g., if significant wind generation exists there. In particular, we simulated a case in which net demand could
be 0 or −800 MW at each of Country 1’s nodes. The general magnitude of benefits did not appreciably
differ from those obtained with Country 2 uncertainty only, so we do not discuss them further.
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Table 1 Generation costs and parameters
i Pmaxi P
min
i FCi MCi SUi Location
Unit 1 200 50 350 15.40 2860 A
Unit 2 375 110 800 20.18 2470 A
Unit 3 250 75 400 27.25 2430 A
Unit 4 400 130 800 19.20 2760 B
Unit 5 420 130 840 26.85 2780 B
Unit 6 850 275 1450 27.24 4100 B
Unit 7 600 165 1200 31.56 4000 C
Unit 8 700 225 1080 41.47 3900 C
Unit 9 1000 300 1640 35.99 3700 D
Unit 10 750 250 1200 36.18 4200 D
CT 1 0 90.00 C
CT 2 0 90.00 D
XA 0 −90.00 A
XB 0 −90.00 B
XC 0 −90.00 C
XD 0 −90.00 D
Table 2 Peak load net of
wind,Dhj P E AK , in all scenarios
(MW)
i HH HL LH LL
A 0 0 0 0
B 0 0 0 0
C 2200 2200 1000 1000
D 2200 1000 2200 1000
Each period lasts for 8 h, resulting in a total number of 24 h. The net load, in this
case, represents the total demand for electricity at each node, net of the amount of
power generated by wind turbines, and also net of the available baseload capacity. As
baseload generation capacity (such as nuclear or large coal plants) is assumed to be
always committed, its inclusion in the unit commitment and real-time dispatch models
would not influence the commitment or generation decisions for other units, nor would
it influence the unit commitment benefits of LMP or the benefits of international redis-
patch. To reduce computational intensity, we therefore subtract the baseload capacity
from the load. However, this does mean that where we express LMP benefits as frac-
tions of the total system costs, these costs exclude the expense of operating baseload
plant (and, of course, the capital costs of any plant).
The four scenarios consist of all possible combinations of low (L) and high (H) net
load at nodes C and D. We assume PRL L = PRH H = a (where the first subscript letter
refers to C’s outcome and the second refers to D’s) and PRL H = PRH L = 0.5 − a,
where a is initially set to 0.25 so that all scenarios have equal probabilities. This
parameter can be interpreted as representing the correlation between net load at nodes
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C and D; when a is set to 1/2, there is a perfect positive correlation, when a is set
to 0, there is a perfect negative correlation. The expected peak load at each node is
independent of a.6
All transmission lines have a maximum capacity of 1000 MW and equal reac-
tances. We use linearised DC approximations to calculate line flows. The scheduling
imbalance penalty CL resulting from deviating from the international flow commit-
ment constraint in Model NTC without international redispatch is assumed to be 90
$/MWh.7 Thus, all penalties (flow deviation and overgeneration) are assumed to be
the same as the cost of combustion turbines. Our results do not change significantly
when these penalties are varied.
As noted above, we only consider day-ahead commitment for a single day, consist-
ing of three time periods. Ramp rate limits, start-up costs that depend on the amount
of time that a plant is shut down, and minimum down- or up-times are omitted.
5 Results
We used Gurobi 2.0.1 to solve both the mixed-integer programs (MIPs) that represent
the unit commitment stage, and the linear programs (LPs) for the real-time dispatch.
We first solve the models for the base case, using the assumptions above, after which
we test the sensitivity of the results to changes in generation, transmission, and load
parameters, in turn.
5.1 Base case
Model LMP by definition minimises expected unit commitment and dispatch costs
subject to the actual network constraints. Model NTC finds a solution using a different
(and incorrect) feasible region in the first stage, through the inclusion of an NTC rather
than network flow constraints in the unit commitment model, followed by a redispatch
to attain feasibility under the actual network constraints. Hence, by the definition of
6 Assuming that baseload generation is approximately equal to the maximum non-baseload generation
(4400 MW, Table 2), and that there is no wind generation at node when its load is 2200 MW, this implies
that the average wind generation is 16% (= (2200 − 1200)/(0.33× (8800 + 7333 + 5867), where the
numerator is the average wind generation and the denominator is the average demand). This is a reasonable
proportion, given the EU’s Renewable Directive of 20% renewable energy by 2020. The directive’s goals, if
achieved, will yield a significantly larger proportion in the electricity sector since substitution of renewable
for non-renewable energy is more economic in the electricity sector than in other sectors.
7 The value is very high in order to motivate adherence to schedules unless they are infeasible, although
sensitivity analyses show that our estimates of redispatch and unit commitment benefits are not appreciably
affected by this assumption. We assume that operators may occasionally take expensive measures to ensure
that flows match schedules between countries. Imbalance penalties within countries are lower, reportedly
0.8–12.3 e/MWh in Europe (International Energy Agency 2007), and can be as high as 30% of the value
of the power in Switzerland and Spain (e.g., Angarita-Márquez et al. 2007). In contrast, explicit economic
imbalance penalties do not exist for inter-controlarea flows in the US; instead, a system experiencing an
area control error must physically make up for the shortage or surplus of power later on. Operators do not
explicitly put a penalty on intersystem schedule deviations, but do indeed take significant actions to avoid
them.
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Fig. 3 LMP coupling benefits as a function of NTC: base case assumptions
optimality, the unit commitment benefits of LMP as calculated by comparing Eq. 15
for the LMP and NTC models can never be negative.
Figure 3 shows the cost difference between the NTC and LMP model solutions,
and thus the nodal pricing benefits, as a percentage of the objective function (expected
dispatch costs for non-baseload generators) in the LMP model. These benefits are
shown as a function of the assumed NTC. A range of 1000–2000 MW for NTC is
considered because values outside that range cannot be optimal: each of the two lines
has a capacity of 1000 MW, so total trade up to 1000 MW can always be accom-
modated, wherever generation and load are located, whereas trade higher than 2000
MW will never be feasible. The results in Fig. 3 can be read as follows. The overall
benefit of LMP (both unit commitment and international redispatch) at a given NTC is
the difference between the uppermost, dashed line (“no international redispatch”) and
zero. The unit commitment benefits alone are the difference between the middle, solid
line (which allows international dispatch), and zero (lower arrow). Consequently, the
international redispatch benefits alone can be interpreted as the difference between
the NID and ID lines (upper arrow).
From this graph, several conclusions can be drawn, although they depend on the
assumed parameters, whose effects will be explored below. Firstly, the unit commit-
ment benefits of LMP are significant. When international redispatch is possible and
NTC can be set optimally so as to minimise the total start-up and variable costs of
generation (between 1860 and 1920 MW, the lowest points on the solid line), they
are still 0.51% of the total system costs under LMP. However, to achieve this, TSOs
would have to know the generation costs for every generator, as well as the exact net
load levels, and then set NTC for every day in order to minimize expected costs. In
fact, TSOs do not, and indeed cannot, fine-tune NTC in this manner, which means that
the actual benefits will be higher, e.g., 1.27% if the NTC is always set at 85% of the
combined thermal capacity of the lines (1700 MW). When international redispatch
is impossible, which reflects the current situation in most European markets, the unit
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commitment benefits of LMP are much higher, with a minimum at 14.25% of total
system costs under LMP (the dashed line in Fig. 3).
Secondly, under the assumed parameters, the benefits of being able to redispatch
internationally are significantly higher than the unit commitment benefits of LMP for
all NTCs higher than 1020 MW. For example, the benefits of international redispatch
are more than 26 times the unit commitment benefits if NTCs can be set optimally.
This suggests that even if full market integration is not possible, more international
coordination on redispatch in balancing markets could bring significant benefits. Such
coordination would bring costs down from the dashed line to the solid line in the
figure.
Finally, the benefits are constant across the NTC-space when international redis-
patch is not possible, the only exception being a minor increase for NTCs smaller
than 1060 MW. This is a direct result of Eq. 7, which specifies that a single dispatch
schedule has to be committed to in the day-ahead unit commitment stage. This dispatch
schedule has to be optimal across all scenarios and, since imbalance penalties are high,
it will be set to avoid penalties from forced imbalances and overgeneration. Hence,
conservative schedules and high levels of commitment in Country 2 will be chosen
day-ahead so that if loads are high, rescheduling penalties can be avoided. Thus, if
international redispatch is not possible, the NTC is less important in determining the
unit commitment benefits of LMP, unless it is set very low, as NTC-NID schedules
will generally be conservatively smaller than in the NTC-ID model. Typically, average
international flows are lower in the NTC-NID model and, consequently, more units
are committed at C and D. For example, for an NTC of 1700 MW, the average inter-
national flow in the NTC-ID model is 1067 MW in the first, 1462 MW in the second,
and 1499 MW in the third period. In the NTC-NID model, these flows are 502, 600
and 1060 MW, respectively. This supports the above conclusion.
In the next subsections, we consider the robustness of these conclusions with respect
to generator, load, and transmission assumptions.
5.2 Generator size and total capacity
To explore the sensitivity of these results to the size of the generators, we vary the
minimum run levels, maximum run levels, start-up costs and fixed costs by ±50%
by multiplying them by a constant ranging between 0.5 and 1.5. Thus, both generator
size and total capacity change proportionally; in Sect. 5.3, we will instead consider
the effect of generator sizes holding total capacity fixed. Figure 4 shows the benefits
for three models: the NTC-ID model with optimal NTCs for every size multiplier;
the same model with an NTC that is always set at 85% of the combined capacity of
the two international lines (i.e., at 1700 MW); and the NTC-NID model with optimal
NTCs.8 In the NTC-NID model, an NTC of 1700 MW is always optimal. This is a
8 An NTC-NID model with NTCs set at 85% of the combined capacity of the two lines was also examined.
However, the results from this model do not differ significantly from the NTC-NID model with optimal
NTCs, and they are therefore not reported separately.
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Fig. 4 Benefits as a function of generator size, with total capacity proportional to size
result of the fact that NTC values matter relatively little in this model, as explained
above.
As Fig. 4 shows, the unit commitment benefits of LMP depend on the generator size.
When international redispatch is possible, the relation between benefits and generator
size is non-monotonic, and does not seem to follow a clear pattern, whether NTCs are
set optimally or not. Under optimal NTCs, the benefits are zero for many size multi-
pliers. When instead international redispatch is impossible, the relation between the
size multiplier and the unit commitment benefits of LMP is also non-monotonic, but
the benefits are significantly lower when generators are small. This happens because,
as generators get smaller, total generation capacity also decreases. Hence, more and
more generators have to be started up and committed in all scenarios, whatever their
costs. As unit commitment benefits arise from sub-optimal commitment, and there is
less room for sub-optimal commitment when there are fewer generators that can be
left unused without compromising feasibility, these benefits shrink as size multipliers
get smaller.
5.3 Generator size with fixed total capacity
In the above analysis, an increase in the capacity of every generator in the system
yields a proportionate increase in total generating capacity. Thus, the effects observed
may be because the balance of supply and demand is changed, or because the ‘lumpi-
ness’ of commitment decisions is altered. In this and the next subsection, we consider
the separate impact of generator size, while holding the ratio of total capacity to load
constant. Although it is not possible to continuously increase the average generator
size while keeping the total capacity constant, we can decrease the generator size by,
e.g., doubling or quadrupling the number of generators and simultaneously decreasing
their capacity so that total capacity does not change. We do this in this subsection,
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Fig. 5 Benefits as a function of generator size, NTC-ID, constant total capacity
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Fig. 6 Benefits as a function of generator size, NTC-NID, constant total capacity
while in the next subsection we instead consider the effect of generator ‘lumpiness’
by varying just the minimum run level.
Figures 5 and 6 compare the unit commitment benefits of LMP in the base case
(size = s) with a model in which the number of generators is doubled, while cutting
their min run and max capacity, start up costs, and fixed costs by 50% (size = s/2).
The limit of this process of shrinking generator size can be represented by treating
the 0–1 commitment variables as continuous rather than binary variables, such that
any fraction can be committed. This results in a linear program. Thus, the third line in
each figure (LP) plots the solution of such a relaxed version of the base case, in which
all zit ’s are continuous variables in the range [0,1].
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Several phenomena can be observed in Figs. 5 and 6. First of all, the variations are
not as large as observed in Fig. 4, indicating that generator size and total system capac-
ity together affect benefits more than the size of individual units alone. Second, when
international redispatch is possible (Fig. 5), the unit commitment benefits of LMP are
higher when units are smaller for most values of NTC, including the optimal one.
When international redispatch is not possible (Fig. 6), this relationship is always the
case. Secondly, the LP formulation can significantly overstate the benefits. Although
it understates them for some values of NTCs, when averaged over the entire range of
NTC, the LP formulation overstates benefits by 0.91% for NTC-ID, and by 0.40% for
NTC-NID. When NTCs are set optimally, the LP formulation overstates the benefits
by 0.09% for NTC-ID, and by 0.41% for NTC-NID; however, for other NTCs, the
overstatement is as large as 2.69 and 0.44%, respectively. This phenomenon occurs
not only under the base case parameters, but also for others, which are not shown
here.9
5.4 Generator minimum run levels
Another way of varying the size of generators while keeping the total generation capac-
ity constant is to change just the minimum run levels, which we achieve by adjusting
those levels by a multiplier. As Fig. 7 shows, the relation between the multiplier and
the commitment benefits of LMP is again non-monotonic, whether international
redispatch is possible or not. However, whereas for the NTC-ID model these ben-
efits are relatively constant, for the NTC-NID model they increase with the minimum
run multiplier.
There are several reasons for these increasing benefits. First of all, increasing mini-
mum run levels favours commitment of fewer generators, because spilling power when
supply is in excess of demand is expensive. For a minimum run multiplier of 0.6, three
units are committed in the first period, six in the second period, and eight in the third
period. Increasing the multiplier to 1 (the base case) results in a reduction to five units
in the second period. Increasing it even further, to 1.4, decreases the commitment
further, to six units in the third period. When fewer units are committed, the chance
that the committed set of units is sub-optimal relative to the realised real-time demand
and wind is greater, leading to larger unit commitment benefits of LMP. Moreover,
when fewer units are committed but the net load remains constant, the reserve
9 This difference between the MIP and LP formulations can be explained by examining the reserve capacity
made available to the real-time market in each model. When the MIP formulation is used, generators are
either started up and committed, in which case they have to produce output between their minimum and
maximum levels, or they are not started up, in which case they cannot produce anything. In many cases,
there will be at least one generator that is not producing at its maximum. This reserve capacity provides
flexibility if, in real time, the actual transmission constraints allow more power to be transported between
the two regions then was anticipated based on the NTC. However, as generators become smaller, the amount
of capacity committed day-ahead can be more closely tailored to particular NTCs, reducing flexibility. In
the extreme case of an LP formulation, just enough generation capacity will be committed to meet the
maximum load and NTC constraints, and no spare capacity is available. We conjecture that this upward
bias of the LP formulation will be smaller in larger systems with few internal transmission constraints.
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Fig. 7 Benefits as a function of minimum run levels
margin decreases, which, as described in the previous subsection, can also increase
these benefits.
The second effect of an increase in minimum run levels is that there is an increasing
probability that power sinks need to be used to maintain real-time feasibility due to
overgeneration, and that real-time imbalance penalties for deviating from international
schedules need to be paid. This also increases the unit commitment benefits of LMP.
As these benefits are increasing in minimum run levels for the NTC-NID model,
and relatively constant for the NTC-ID model, this means that the benefits of inter-
national redispatch are also greater for larger minimum run levels. This implies that,
to some extent, the problems mentioned above can be solved or mitigated by interna-
tional coordination on redispatch; in particular, such coupling of balancing markets
decreases the use of power sinks and eliminates imbalance penalties on international
flows.
5.5 Relative transmission capacity
The amount of transmission relative to the sizes of the markets might be expected to
affect the benefits of LMP. To facilitate comparison with the other sensitivity analyses,
we simulate the effect of changes in relative transmission capacity by decreasing or
increasing all load and generation capacity by the same amount, while holding trans-
mission constant.10 Capacity-related costs, in particular start-up and fixed running
10 If we instead varied transmission capacity, then the range of values within which the optimal NTC
can fall changes. In all the other analyses, NTC can vary from 1000 to 2000 MW. But if, for example, the
transmission capacity is halved, the optimal NTC will lie between 500 and 1000 MW. This complicates
comparison with the other sensitivity analyses. Therefore, instead of scaling the transmission capacity up
and down while keeping all other parameters constant, we scale all other parameters up and down, while
keeping transmission capacity constant.
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Fig. 8 Benefits as a function of generator/load size (larger values indicate smaller relative transmission
capacity)
costs, are also varied proportionally. Multiplying these parameters by x is equivalent
to a decrease in transmission capacity of 1/x .
The results are shown in Fig. 8. For this model, NTC-NID, benefits decrease in
the size/load multiplier, and thus strictly increase in the transmission capacity, all else
being equal. The reason is that when the available transmission capacity decreases
relative to demand and the average generator size, more units close to the load in
Country 2 will have to be committed, at the expense of exporting units in Country 1.
In the extreme case, where the available transmission capacity is close to zero, only
Country 2 units will be committed and there can be few opportunities for international
redispatch. When a smaller share of demand is imported, the costs of sub-optimal
commitment go down.
Consequently, international coordination on redispatch can mitigate a large part
of the inefficiencies of NTC-based market coupling. However, even when interna-
tional redispatch is possible, the unit commitment benefits of LMP can still be signifi-
cant, especially when NTCs are not set optimally. However, as with most parameters,
although the benefits are sensitive to the size/load multipliers (and thus to transmission
capacity), this relation is highly non-monotonic.
5.6 Load levels
Next, we test the sensitivity of the unit commitment benefits of LMP to the net loads
at nodes C and D (the only nodes at which there is demand) by varying the load by
±50%. Figure 9 shows the results. These results look similar to those in Fig. 8 where,
in addition to the net load, generator sizes are also varied, and the conclusions that can
be drawn from them are qualitatively the same.
In particular, the unit commitment benefits of LMP are sensitive to load levels.
When international redispatch is possible, this relationship is highly non-monotonic.
Yet when international redispatch is impossible, a higher load relative to the available
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Fig. 9 Benefits as a function of load
transmission capacity almost always leads to lower benefits, for the same reasons we
provided in the previous subsection. However, the variation of possible benefits is
greater when load alone is varied than when load and generation are varied in pro-
portion; thus, the effects of higher load and higher capacity appear to partially cancel
each other.
5.7 Load asymmetry
Figure 9 displayed the unit commitment benefits of LMP when the net loads in nodes
C and D are scaled up or down simultaneously. Figure 10 shows these benefits when
instead the load at node C is multiplied by x , while the load at node D is multiplied
by (2 − x), where x is the load asymmetry multiplier, thus increasing the asym-
metry in loads between the two nodes. As asymmetry increases (i.e., as x diverges
from 1.0), transmission flows might then tend to be concentrated on one line rather
than spread evenly between the two international lines. Hence, we anticipated that
increasing asymmetry would inflate the benefit of considering actual transmission con-
straints and flows in day-ahead decisions compared to a single NTC between the two
countries.
Surprisingly, however, an increase in benefits as x moved further from 1.0 was not
observed. The unit commitment benefits of LMP peak at a load asymmetry multiplier
of 0.85 for NTC-ID with optimal NTCs and NTC-NID, and at a multiplier of 1.05
for NTC-ID with an NTC of 1700 MW. On either side of these multipliers, benefits
decrease. This is not only true for optimal NTCs and NTCs set at 1700 MW, but for
most NTCs.
The reasons for these effects are complex, as several things change simultaneously
when the load asymmetry multiplier is varied. First, although more asymmetric loads
can lead to higher benefits of LMP, the load asymmetry does not increase by the same
123
Locational-based coupling of electricity markets 245
0%
4%
8%
12%
16%
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
B
en
ef
it 
[%
 of
 LM
P 
co
sts
]
Load asymmetry multiplier
ID - Optimal NTC
ID - NTC 85%
NID - Optimal 
NTC
Fig. 10 Benefits as a function of load asymmetry
proportion in every real-time scenario, and there is always one scenario in which the
load asymmetry actually decreases if load asymmetry multipliers move further away
from 1. Secondly, the distribution of the total net load across the scenarios changes
with the load asymmetry multiplier. In the base case, there is one scenario with a total
net load of 4400 MW (scenario HH), two with a net load of 3200 MW (scenarios HL
and LH) and one with a net load of 2000 MW (scenario LL). When the load asymmetry
multiplier is varied, the total net load at C and D in scenarios HH and LL does not
change, and neither does the average load across all scenarios. However, the loads in
scenarios HL and LH do change, for example, to 2600 MW and 3800 MW, respec-
tively, for a multiplier of 0.5. These effects interact with the other model constraints
to result in the benefit curves shown in Fig. 10, which show that the benefits of LMP
do not necessarily increase if loads become more asymmetric, and that they may even
decrease.
The figures also show that the benefits of international redispatch vary only slightly
with the load asymmetry multiplier. For instance, when NTCs are not set optimally,
the additional benefit of international redispatch is relatively constant around 12.7%.
In contrast, the unit commitment benefits vary considerably (on a proportional basis)
over the range of x, from zero to 0.8 and 1.8% for the optimal NTC and 85% NTC
(1700 MW) cases, respectively.
5.8 Load correlation
Finally, we consider the correlation in net loads at nodes C and D by changing scenario
probabilities by varying parameter a. As noted above, this parameter can be interpreted
as a correlation, where a = 0 represents perfect positive correlation (when load is high
at one node, it is high at the other), a = 0.25 a situation with zero correlation, and
a = 0.5 perfect negative correlation (high load at one node is balanced by low load at
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Fig. 11 Benefits as a function of load correlation
the other). Thus, r = 1 − 4a is the correlation of loads in nodes C and D. Figure 11
shows the results of a model runs with varying correlations.
From most values of r , the benefits increase in r for the NTC-ID model with
optimal NTC and the NTC-NID model, although, as elsewhere, this relationship is
non-monotonic. In the NTC-NID model, this relationship is less pronounced but still
noticeable. These results are surprising. When the correlation is high between the
net loads in nodes C and D, it is likely that the flows on the two international trans-
mission lines will not be far apart. When this correlation decreases, there is more
asymmetry in loads, and consequently the flows on the two transmission lines are
more likely to diverge. In that situation, representing the four transmission constraints
in the system with a single NTC is more difficult, which could lead to larger LMP
benefits.
However, as in the earlier analysis where the load asymmetry was varied, this is
not the only way in which the correlation can affect the benefits. Firstly, there is also
a total load effect, as the variance of the total load (C + D) across scenarios increases
in r. Secondly, as explained above, the non-anticipativity constraint in Eq. 9 can cause
the net load in the extreme scenario HH to constrain the commitment of genera-
tors in node A and B. The probability of this scenario is, of course, also a function
of r .
This illustrates that it is not always straightforward to anticipate the effects of a
parameter on the benefits of LMP. Several effects can interact to produce counterin-
tuitive results.
6 Conclusions
First, coupling international day-ahead and real-time power markets using nodal pric-
ing can provide significant benefits compared to NTC-based market coupling only
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day-ahead. Although this has already been shown by other studies, these did not con-
sider the combined effect of unit commitment constraints and uncertain load and wind
forecasts. Our simulations indicate that LMP can significantly improve unit commit-
ment decisions, saving between 0 and 2% of the fuel costs of non-baseload plants
(0–1% of total fuel costs), depending on the assumed parameters. This can be com-
pared to the 0.1% of European fuel costs reported in Barth et al. (2009), the only study
that is directly comparable to ours. However, unlike our analysis, their study did not
consider within country transmission, commitment of individual units, or a range of
NTC values.
Secondly, full LMP-based market coupling of both day-ahead and in real-time mar-
kets will, at least in theory, lead to the lowest costs. However, international coordination
of balancing while respecting transmission constraints can provide significant benefits
even if unit commitment considers only NTC constraints rather than the full network.
Such coordination would allow intermarket power schedules to adapt to real-time load
and wind conditions and thereby encourage trade. This supports the conclusions of
Vandezande et al. (2009). In our system, the benefits of international redispatch are at
least an order of magnitude greater than the unit commitment benefits of LMP under
most assumptions.
Finally, although both benefits can be significant, their magnitudes greatly depend
on the exact technical characteristics of the markets. Generator sizes, demand lev-
els at the various nodes, installed transmission capacity, load asymmetry and load
correlation can all influence these benefits, and a small change in any one of these
parameters can result in significant increases or decreases, especially for unit com-
mitment benefits. These effects are often non-monotonic functions of the charac-
teristics, and are unlikely to be generalisable; thus, benefits for specific systems
need to be estimated by using parameters appropriate for those systems, consid-
ering the variation of loads and other parameters over the year. For our test sys-
tems, at their largest, benefits can amount to more than 25% of optimal production
costs for non-baseload plants when international redispatch is not possible, and more
than 2% when it is, although they are more typically around 8 and 0.8%, respec-
tively.
Although our numerical results cannot therefore be viewed as definitive state-
ments of the effect of various parameters, some trends are evident. When interna-
tional redispatch is possible, smaller generators, higher minimum run levels and more
symmetric, positively correlated loads at different locations (net of wind) usually
lead to higher benefits. When international redispatch is not possible, the effects
of parameter choices often have a pronounced trend. In that case, smaller gen-
erators, higher minimum run levels, larger transmission capacities, and loads that
are lower, more symmetric or positively correlated generally result in higher bene-
fits. In both situations, continuous approximations of binary commitment variables
can significantly overstate the unit commitment benefits of LMP-based market cou-
pling for small systems. These results are summarised in Table 3, in the appen-
dix.
We note, however, that our estimates of the benefits of LMP and international redis-
patch may be overstated for two reasons. First, even if operators run day-ahead markets
considering only NTC values between markets, generation owners may alter their unit
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commitment if they recognize that cost savings are possible once real-time arrives.
In particular, if those owners are forward-looking, anticipating the effect of impos-
ing network constraints upon the real-time market, and there are no restrictions on
international redispatch, they might self-commit units subject to the actual network
constraints rather just the NTC. This could improve the efficiency of commitment
under NTC constraints and thereby lower the incremental benefits of LMP, especially
in a simple network, such as the one we considered. However, as networks get larger
or more complex, this will be more difficult, as more information is needed in order
to self-commit optimally.
Secondly, we have analysed a relatively small system and, to determine the unit
commitment and international redispatch benefits of LMP without distortion from
other market failures, we have not included some market features currently observed
in European markets. In particular, we have not included any security constraints due to
possible equipment outages. Their inclusion could change the results. Larger systems
should be analysed in future research using stochastic unit commitment formulations
that include such security constraints.
Nonetheless, our findings indicate that LMP-based market coupling can signif-
icantly increase the operating efficiency of electricity markets. This conclusion is
particularly relevant to ongoing debates in zonal pricing markets in Europe and the
US where regulators are presently considering how to deal with rising congestion
that is exacerbated by increasing penetration of intermittent wind power.11 We also
show that, even in the absence of full LMP-based market coupling, coordination of
neighbouring balancing markets could significantly lower costs of unit commitment
and dispatch. At the same time, our sensitivity analyses indicate that it is unlikely
that estimates of the benefits of LMP in particular electricity markets can be applied
one-to-one to other markets, as they are highly sensitive to network and generation
parameters. This indicates that market-specific research is necessary to quantify the
exact magnitude of the benefits of LMP.
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